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THE STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE; 
This is a negligence action filed by the plaintiff Paul 
Litchefeld against defendants Jerry Cutshaw dba Interior 
Contracting and Max J. Smith and Max J. Smith & Associates, 
Architects. It is alleged in plaintiff's complaint that the 
defendants were negligent in the construction and inspection of 
the plaintiff's cabin located near Guardman Pass, Wasatch 
County, Utah. On April 6, 1986 the roof of the cabin collapsed. 
The cabin, contents, furnishings, and personal property were all 
damaged. The damages to the structure and the contents amounted 
to $127,645.29. It is alleged by the plaintiff that the 
negligence of the defendants was the proximate cause of 
plaintiff's damages. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about April 6, 1986 the plaintiff, Paul 
Litchefeld was the owner of the schick-son cabin near Guardman 
Pass, Wasatch County, Utah. The roof on the cabin collapsed. 
The cabin, contents, furnishings, and personal property were all 
damaged. The damages to the structure and the contents amounted 
to $127,645.29. (R. 3-4). 
As a result of the collapse of the cabin roof, the 
plaintiff commenced a lawsuit against the defendants for 
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negligence in construction and inspection of the cabin. (R. 12-
5). 
In response to the plaintiff's summons and complaint, 
the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and a supporting 
Memorandum, together with affidavits of Max A, Smith and Jerry 
Cutshaw. (R. 16-31) 
The defendants' Memorandum in Support of their Motion 
to Dismiss, raises Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25.5 (1953 as 
amended) as a defense to the plaintiff's claim. That section 
prevents recovery of damages from any person on the account of 
"furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or 
construction of such improvements to real property more than 
seven years after the completion of construction." (R. 25) 
The cabin was substantially completed by Thanksgiving, 
1978. The collapse of the cabin occurred on April 6, 1986 which 
was approximately 4 and a half months after the seven year 
statutory period of repose had expired. (R. 2-4 and 19 -22) 
Oral argument was held in the Third Judicial District 
Court on December 10, 1987. On February 11, 1988 Judge John A. 
Rokich issued a memorandum decision granting defendants1 Motion 
to Dismiss. He stated in part ". . .however, the court believes 
that plaintiff's case is not without merit. The court has 
reservations about its ruling but will follow precedent of the 
2 
present Utah Case law." (R. 101-104) (emphasis in original) 
The Order of Dismissal was signed on March 8, 1988 by 
Judge John A. Rokich, and Notice of Appeal was filed by 
plaintiff on March 30, 1988. (R. 113-116) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
!• Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of 
Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate the 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 by depriving plaintiff equal 
protection of laws? 
2. Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of 
Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate the 
Utah Const, art. I, § 2 and art. I, § 24 by depriving plaintiff 
equal protection of laws? 
3. Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of 
Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate the 
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 by depriving plaintiff access to courts 
and redress of injuries? 
4. Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of 
Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended), violate 
the Utah Const, art. VI, § 26 forbidding special laws or 
legislation? 
5. Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of 
Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate the 
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Utah Const, art. VI, § 23 requiring that only one subject to be 
clearly expressed in the Statutory Title? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The following statute should be considered when 
determining a resolution of this action: 
Laws of Utah 1967, Chapter 218, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25.5, (1953 as amended). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant contends that the District Court erred in 
relying on Good vs. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974) which 
impliedly upholds the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 78-
12-25.5 (1953 as amended). In Berry vs. Beech Air Craft, 717 
P. 2d 769 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court found the Products 
Liability Statute of Repose unconstitutional because it violated 
the Utah Const, art. I, § 11 and art. XVI, § 5. The Utah 
Supreme Court should also find that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 
(1953 as amended) is unconstitutional in light of the Berry 
decision. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) also 
violates U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 and Utah Const, art. I § 2 
and § 24 by depriving plaintiff equal protection of laws. The 
appellant contends the class of people that are similarly 
situated are architects, contractors, engineers, materialman, 
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suppliers, laborers and owners. The above individuals are all 
similarly situated since they all have major roles in the 
completion of an improvement to real property. It is 
unreasonable to classify contractors, architects and engineers 
differently from materialman, suppliers, laborers, and owners. 
It is unreasonable to confer a grant of immunity from suit to 
contractors, architects, and engineers while not conferring the 
same privileges to materialman, suppliers, laborers and owners. 
The appellant contends that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 
(1953 as amended) is unconstitutional violating the Utah Const, 
art. I, § 11 depriving appellant access to court and redress of 
injuries. The Utah Const, art. I, § 11 was relied upon by the 
Utah Supreme Court in striking Utah's Product Liability Act. 
The appellant has been denied access to the courts of Utah since 
period of repose had lapsed before the appellant knew he had a 
cause of action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) is 
unconstitutional since it violates the Utah Const, art. VI, § 26 
forbidding special laws or legislation. The appellants are given 
an immunity from suit not granted other individuals. The above 
statute singles out architects, contractors and engineers and 
gives them preferential treatment. 
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Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) 
is unconstitutional violating the Utah Const, art. VI, § 23 which 
requires that only one subject be clearly expressed in the 
Statutory Title of legislation. 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANN, SECTION 78-12-25.5 (1953 AS 
AMENDED) DOES NOT ACT AS A LIMITATION TO AN 
OWNER OR PERSON IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE 
PROPERTY 
The plain language of the statute indicates that it is 
not to act as a limitation or apply to any person in actual 
possession or control as the owner of the property. The last two 
paragraphs of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) state 
as follows: 
". . . the limitation imposed by this 
provision shall not apply to any person in 
actual possession and control as owner, 
tenant or otherwise, of the improvement at 
the time the defective and unsafe condition 
of such improvement constitutes the proximate 
cause of the injury for which it is proposed 
to bring an action. 
This provision shall not be construed as 
extending or limiting the period otherwise 
prescribed by laws of this State for the 
bringing of any action." 
These last two paragraphs have not been interpreted by 
the courts of Utah to the best of the appellants knowledge. 
Since the appellant, Paul Lichtefeld, was the actual owner of the 
cabin and property when the roof collapsed, it is clear that the 
limitation imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as 
amended) should not be applicable to him. The clear language of 
the statute states it should not be "construed as extending or 
limiting the period otherwise prescribed for the bringing of any 
action." The normal statutory period prescribed by law is found 
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (1953) and is three years. This is 
the statutory period which the court should follow. Utah Code 
Ann. 78-12-26 (1953) is the appropriate statute to reference 
since damage occurred to the owner not a third party. If Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) is referenced, 
then the owner is left without a party to sue for redress of 
injuries, since immunity is granted to designers and planners. 
Therefore, the limitation imposed by this statute 
should not bar the appellant from pursuing a cause of action 
against the architect, contractor or related parties. Appellant 
commenced his cause of action timely had the normal statute of 
limitation been followed, namely Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 
(1953). Consequently, this court should direct this case back 
to the District Court reversing Honorable Judge John A. Rokich's 
Order of Dismissal. 
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON GOOD 
VS. CHRISTENSEN WHICH IMPLIEDLY UPHOLDS THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH CODE ANN. 78-12-
25.5 (1953 AS AMENDED) 
Good vs. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974) did not 
involve any constitutional analysis of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
25.5 (1953 as amended). In light of the decision of Berry vs. 
Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) the pervasiveness of 
Good vs. Christensen should be seriously questioned. 
In Berrv v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) 
the Utah Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the 
Utah Product Liability Act. The Utah Product Liability Act and 
the challenged statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as 
amended), are Statutes of Repose. The result in Berry was a 
holding that the Product Liability Statute of Repose was 
unconstitutional, since it violated Utah Const, art. I, § 11 and 
art. XVI, § 5. The statute provided that Products Liability 
actions were barred if filed more than six years after the date 
of initial purchase of the product or ten years after the date of 
its manufacture despite the date of injury. The courts analysis 
in Berrv vs. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) is 
applicable to the Architects and Builders Statute of Repose found 
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in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended). It too should 
be found unconstitutional. 
A Statute of Repose is not designed to allow an 
individual a reasonable amount of time to file a lawsuit. 
Indeed, as explained in Berry vs. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1985) the Court stated: 
". . . the Statute of Repose may bar the 
filing of a lawsuit even though the cause of 
action did not arise until after it was 
barred and even though the injured person was 
diligent in seeking a judicial remedy." 
Berry at 672. 
The collapse of the appellants roof, which gives rise to this 
lawsuit, occurred approximately four and a half months after the 
period of repose had expired. This lawsuit was commenced 
approximately a year and a half after the collapse of the roof. 
This was timely if the normal statutory period in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-26 (1953 as amended) (3 years) were found applicable. 
Finally, this Court stated in Berry vs. Beech 
Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) when reflecting on the 
analysis in Good vs. Christensen. 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974) and 
held as follows: 
" . . . In sustaining the statute, the Court 
declined to make any analysis of the 
constitutional claims raised. It simply made 
the conclusionary statement that the attack 
on the constitutionality of the statute was 
without merit. Whether the Court in fact 
addressed the merits of Utah Const, art. I, § 
11 is speculative, and the ruling, 
therefore, has little pervasive effect here." 
Berry vs. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d at 683. 
As will be shown, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as 
amended) also violates state and federal constitutional 
guarantees. 
POINT III 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 AS AMENDED) 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATES U.S. CONST. 
AMEND. XIV, § 1 BY DEPRIVING APPELLANT EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF LAWS 
Before the challenged statute can be found 
unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection under the 
state or the federal constitution, it must first be determined 
under what standard of review the legislation is scrutinized. It 
may appear that the mere rationality test, which is the least 
probing standard of review, would apply to statutes such as the 
challenged statute, since it is not based upon "suspect 
classifications." However, the U.S. Supreme Court has developed 
a mid level review or test for classifications, for example, 
based on gender or illegitimacy. Craig vs. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 
97 S. Ct. 451, 50 L. Ed.2d 397 (1976). Appellant suggests that 
in cases involving access to judicial process, more probing 
scrutiny should be used other than "mere rationality". Access to 
judicial process should be scrutinized closer than economic 
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issues, which are usually subject to mere rationality. 
However, as will be shown, other State Supreme Courts have 
stricken similar statutes using the mere rationality test. 
Whether using the mere rationality test or a higher theory of 
review, the challenged statute does not pass constitutional 
muster. 
One of the first cases to strike a statute similar to 
Utah's on Equal Protection grounds was Skinner vs. Anderson, 231 
N.E.2d 588 (111. 1967). The Illinois Supreme Court struck down a 
statute which prohibited an action being filed against any person 
who performed or was furnishing "the design, planning, 
supervision of construction or construction of improvements to 
real property if more than four years have passed since the 
furnishing of the services." The reasoning of the Skinner court 
was so persuasive that most courts cite to it as the the seminal 
decision. The theory of the case was quoted in Phillips vs. ABC 
Builders, Inc.r 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980), State Farm and Casualty 
Company vs. All Electric, Inc., 660 P.2d 995 (Nev. 1983); 
Henderson Clay Products vs. Edgar Wood, 451 A.2d 174 (N.H. 
1982), Broome vs. Truluck, 421 S.E.2d 739 (S. C. 1978); Loyal 
Order of Moose, vs. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977). Many 
courts have found the language of Skinner vs. Anderson, 231 
N.E.2d 588 (111. 1967) to be so persuasive that they have quoted 
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a substantial portion of that decision verbatim. Any attempts to 
condense the highlights of Skinner will necessarily result in a 
loss of meaning and clarity. Therefore, it also merits inclusion 
here: 
M
. . .If, as the defendant suggests, the 
objective of the statute is to require that 
trials of actions based upon defects in 
construction be held within a relatively 
short time after the work is completed, that 
objective is achieved only partially, and in 
a discriminatory fashion. If the damage or 
injury occurs at any time within 4 years 
after construction is completed, the time 
within which the action must be commenced is 
governed by other statutory limitations. In 
such cases the time between completion of 
construction and the required institution of 
suit may well exceed 4 years. 
More important is the fact that of all those 
whose negligence in connection with the 
construction of the improvement to real 
estate might result in damage to property or 
injury to person more that 4 years after 
construction is completed, the statute 
singles out the architect and the 
contractor, and grants them immunity. It is 
not at all inconceivable that the owner or 
person in control of such an improvement 
might be held liable for damage or injury 
that results from a defective condition for 
which the architect or contractor is in fact 
responsible. Not only is the owner or person 
in control given no immunity; the statute 
takes away his action for indemnity against 
the architect or contractor. 
The arbitrary quality of the statute clearly 
appears when we consider that architects and 
contractors are not the only persons whose 
negligence in the construction of a building 
or other improvement made on damage to 
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property or injury to persons. If, for 
example, 4 years after a building is 
completed a cornice should fall because the 
adhesive used was defective, the 
manufacturer of the adhesive is granted no 
immunity. And so it is with all others who 
furnish materials used in constructing the 
improvement. But if the cornice fell because 
of defective design or construction for which 
an architect or contractor was responsible, 
immunity is granted. It cannot be said that 
one event is more likely than the other to 
occur within 4 years after construction is 
completed. 
Of course, section 22 of art. IV does not 
prohibit legislative classification. It 
does, however, require that the 
classification be reasonably related to the 
that legislative purpose. And where the 
relationship was non existent the statute 
has been held to countervene the 
constitutional provision. (Citations 
omitted.) That the statutes benefits all 
architects and construction contractor is 
significant if the benefits conferred upon 
them are not denied others similarly 
situated. As this article held with respect 
to the section 22 of art. IV that the 
statute operates uniformly upon all members 
of a class created as the beneficiaries of 
the act is not the full test to be applied, 
but in order to avoid the constitutional 
inhibition last above quoted it must also 
appear that there is a sound basis, in reason 
and principal, for regarding the class of 
individuals as a distinct and separate class 
for the purpose of the particular 
legislation." Skinner v. Anderson, 231 
N.E.2d at 590, 591. (emphasis added) 
Probably the most significant statement in Skinner is 
the portion emphasized where the court discusses the possibility 
that an owner or person in control of an improvement may be held 
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liable for damage or injury that results from a defective 
condition for which the architect or contractor is in fact 
responsible. This is the exact scenario that the appellant 
advances before this court. The report of Arnold W. Coon 
(Addendum 1), indicates that in his opinion the roof of the cabin 
was not constructed according to design specifications. 
Furthermore, the deviations from the specifications were of such 
a nature that the architect should have noticed the deviations 
through periodic walk through inspections of the premises. 
Consequently, if the challenged statute is not found 
unconstitutional, the owner will be held responsible for the 
contractors and architect's negligence when in fact, the owner 
(appellant) had no reason to believe that the roof and structure 
were unsound. No rational argument can be advanced that the 
appellant should be held responsible for the latent defects. 
Also, no rational argument can be advanced to support 
the proposition that owners, tenants, materialman, suppliers, and 
laborers should be a separate class from architects, engineers 
and construction contractors. All these individuals play 
important roles in constructing an improvement to real property. 
Many courts have suggested distinctions to justify the 
separate classifications. First, it is argued that owners, 
tenants and materialman have continuing control over access to 
14 
and maintenance of the property. Klein vs. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 
514 (Mass. 1982), Freezer Storage vs. Armstrong Cork, 382 A.2d 
715 (Pa. 1978). 
Next, the courts also point to the different treatment 
of owners and tenants at common law; such as the larger class of 
potential plaintiffs who may sue design professionals; the legal 
theories available to those plaintiffs; and the common law 
defenses available only to landlords and tenants. Freezer 
Storage, 382 A.2d at 718-720. Others cite the possibility of 
defective maintenance and alterations. Yarbow vs. Hilton Hotels. 
655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1982). 
Other justifications are also cited to support the 
distinction between owners, suppliers, materialmen and design 
professionals. One argument is that, because materialmen provide 
standard goods manufactured by standard processes, they may be 
held to higher quality control standards than the design 
professional, whose work is often unique and cannot be completely 
tested. Klein, 437 N.E.2d 524; Freezer Storage, 328 A.2d at 719. 
In other words, buildings are more complex than their component 
parts. Furthermore, design professionals have special expertise; 
they should be encouraged to experiment in their creativity and 
should not be stifled. Klein, 437 N.E.2d at 524; O'Brien vs. 
Hazelet and Erdal. 299 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. 1980). 
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None of these diverse rationals are persuasive. One 
effect of the statute of repose is to eliminate the statutory 
right of contribution among tortfeasors. It follows that when 
an unprotected owner is 50% at fault and a protected contractor 
is 50% at fault, the unprotected owner would be 100% liable for 
all damages, without a remedy for contribution. The statute of 
repose, therefore, does not entirely abrogate liability for 
defective design, but shifts it. Thus the potential interest of 
joint tortfeasors in obtaining contributions, in addition to the 
claimants interest in suing a particular party, must be 
considered. Since the owner had no knowledge of any latent 
defects, its not reasonable or rational that he should be liable 
for them. 
The Supreme Court of Alaska in Turner Construction Co. 
vs. Scales, 752 P. 2d 467 (Ala. 1988) examined the above 
arguments in detail. In striking the Alaska statute, which is 
similar to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended), that 
court held: 
"There is no substantial rational between 
exempting design professionals from 
liability, shifting liability for defective 
design and construction to owners and 
material suppliers, and the goal of 
encouraging construction. The shift of 
liability to unprotected parties increases 
their incentive to build in corresponding 
measure to the increased incentives of 
protected parties. If anything, the dis-
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incentive on the part of owners may be 
greater than their portional measure of 
liability shift, because they may be liable 
for a product over which they have no 
control. Moreover, design defects may be 
catastrophic, and experimental designs shift 
correspondingly greater unknown risk to 
owners, giving them even more reason not to 
finance construction. Thus, we believe that 
the statutory means are not substantially or 
relationally related to the ends. We 
conclude that A.S. 09.10.055 violates the 
equal protection clause of the Alaska 
Constitution." Turner Construction Co. v. 
Scales, 762 P.2d at 472. 
Many courts have stricken similar statutes on federal 
equal protection grounds. They are: McClanahan vs. American 
Gilsonite, 494 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Colo. 1980), State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Co., vs. All Electric, Inc., 660 P.2d 995 (Nev. 1983), 
Henderson Clay Products, Inc. vs. Edgar Wood and Associates, Inc. 
451 A.2d 174 (N.H. 1982), Phillips vs. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 
P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980), Broome vs. Truluck, 241 S.E.2d 739 (S.C. 
1978), Loval Order of Moose, vs. Kavness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 
1977), and Fujioka vs. Kam, 514 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1973) and Shibuya 
vs. Architects Hawaii LTD, 647 P.2d 276 (Haw. 1982). 
Consequently, it is clear that similarly situated 
people are not being treated similarly. Whether examining the 
constitutionality of challenged statute under mere rationally or 
a higher theory of review, the statute fails to pass 
constitutional muster. 
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POINT IV 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 AS AMENDED) 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATES UTAH CONST. 
ART. I, § 2, AND ART. I# § 24 BY DEPRIVING 
APPELLANT EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS 
The Utah Const, art. I, § 2 states as follows: 
"All political power is inherent in the 
people; and all free governments are founded 
on their authority for their equal protection 
and benefit, and they have the right to alter 
or reform their government as a public 
welfare require". 
Also, Utah Const, art. I, § 24 states as follows: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform application." 
Even though Utah Const, art. I, § 2 uses the language 
"equal protection" it appears to be a statement of the purpose of 
government more than a legal standard used to measure 
governmental action. In Liedtke vs. Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah 
1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated that Utah Const, art. I, § 
2 4 is generally considered the equivalent of the equal 
protection clause of the U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 
The most recent state to strike a Architect and Builder 
Statute of Repose was the Supreme Court of Alaska in Turner 
Construction Co. vs. Scales. 752 P.2d 467 (Ala. 1988) previously 
cited. In Turner an action was brought against a construction 
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company when a fire destroyed an apartment complex. The district 
court ruled that the 6 year Statute of Repose is unconstitutional 
violating the equal protection clause of the state constitution. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court ruling. The only 
substantial difference between Alaska statute and Utah's is that 
the Alaska statute has a 2 year savings clause. 
In Turner. the design professionals contended that the 
injured plaintiff's lack standing to challenge the statute, 
suggesting that they were not members of the class of 
unprotected defendants. Furthermore, the design professionals 
contended that the statute is constitutional. 
The court stated as follows on the standing issue: 
"The injured plaintiffs first constitutional 
claim is based upon the rights of third-
parties-potential defendants, such as owners 
and tenants, who are not protected by the 
statute. Every court which has addressed the 
issue has concluded that persons such as the 
plaintiffs are proper parties to assert this 
claim, because they are precluded from 
asserting their own rights against defendants 
who might otherwise be liable; the statute 
narrows the group against which recovery is 
available. McClanahan vs. American 
Gilsonite, 494 F. Supp. 1334, 1342-44 (D. Co. 
1980); Shibuya vs. Architects Hawaii, 647 
P.2d 276, 282 (Haw. 1982). The injured 
plaintiff's interest in invalidating the 
statute is as great as that of the 
materialmen or the defendant in possession. 
Klein vs. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 523 
(1982). We find this reasoning persuasive, 
therefore, we conclude that the injured 
plaintiffs have standing to assert the equal 
19 
protection." Turner Construction Co, v. 
Scales, 752 P.2d at 470. 
Likewise, the appellant has standing to assert the 
constitutional challenges raised. He is in fact a member of a 
class of unprotected plaintiffs, namely other owners. 
Consequently, there is no standing issue to be addressed. 
The Utah Const, art. I, § 24 protects against two types 
of discrimination. First, the law must apply equally to all 
persons within a class. Second, the statutory classifications 
and the different treatment given the classes must be based on 
differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the 
objective of the statute. Malan vs. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 
(Utah 1984). 
If the relationship of the classification to the 
statutory objectives are unreasonable or fanciful, the 
discrimination is unreasonable. 
Utah's Architects and Builders statute of repose 
classifies defendants based on their occupation or the nature of 
the work they perform. It classifies plaintiffs based on the 
time of their injury. Neither of these two categories are a 
suspect class. The right asserted is the interest in suing a 
particular party, which is not a fundamental constitutional 
right; nevertheless, the interest in redressing wrongs through 
the judicial process is a significant one. Wilson vs. 
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Municipality of Anchorage, 669 P.2d 569, 572 (Ala. 1983). 
The Supreme Court in recent years appears to have 
altered the standard of review for regulating the exercise of a 
fundamental constitutional right. In many cases, the Court still 
maintains that it will employ strict scrutiny when the government 
allocates the ability to exercise fundamental rights differently 
among various classifications of persons. The identification of 
a right as "fundamental" is a substantive decision unrelated to 
equal protection or technical standards of review. However, the 
court in the 1960's and early 1970's had indicated that laws 
making differentiations between persons exercising fundamental 
rights would be subject to strict judicial scrutiny and would not 
be upheld unless the government could demonstrate that it was 
necessary for it to use the classification in order to promote a 
compelling state interest. Loving vs. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 
S. Ct. 1817, 18 L. Ed.2d 1010 (1967) (marriage); Kramer vs. 
Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S. Ct. 1886, 23 L. 
Ed.2d 583 (1969) (voting); Shapiro vs. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 
89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed.2d 600 (1969) (interstate travel); Dunn 
vs. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed.2d 274 
(1972) (travel and voting). 
As a consequence, access to the Courts of Utah and 
redress of injuries as constitutionally guaranteed in the Utah 
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Const, art. I, § 11 should at least be subject to the mid level 
standard of review. Craig vs. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197; 97 S.Ct. 
451, 50 L. Ed.2d 397 (1976). The court should find that there 
is no substantial reason for the exempting design professionals 
from liability while failing to protect owners, materialman and 
suppliers who are similarly situated. No important governmental 
objective can be served by making such a discriminatory 
classification. Consequently, this court should hold Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) unconstitutional as did the 
Supreme Court of Alaska in Turner Construction Co. vs. Scales, 
752 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1988). 
In Henderson Clay Products vs. Edgar Wood, 451 A.2d 174 
(N.H. 1982) the owner of a shopping mall brought an action 
against a supplier of bricks alleging the bricks on the 
department store were peeling, falling apart and generally 
disintegrating. The Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss 
and the supplier appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the 
Superior Court. The substance of the plaintiffs claim, simply 
stated, is that materialman and suppliers of labor have a six 
year statute of limitation which begins to run upon discovery of 
the cause of action, while architects are relieved from liability 
six years after the performance of their services irrespective of 
the fact that the cause of action is not discovered until later. 
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What becomes a six year statute for one group does not 
necessarily become a six year statute for the other. The Court 
in Henderson stated as follows: 
"The statute under consideration here has set 
up a classification whereby architects and 
contractors are singled out for protection 
not granted to materialman or the suppliers 
of labor. It is difficult to rationally 
permit a situation to exist whereby the 
supplier of labor and material has a 
liability exposure for a period of six years 
after the injury has been discovered or, in 
the exercise of due care, should have been 
discovered when, at the same time, the 
designers of the premises can be immunized 
from the liability before the cause of action 
even occurs or can be factually asserted." 
Henderson at 175. 
Finally, the court in Henderson vs Edgar Wood, 451 A.2d 
174 (N.H. 1982) correctly reasoned that materialman and 
suppliers are part of the same class as architects and builders. 
The court held: 
"In the construction of an ordinary building, 
whether modest or substantial, there are 
necessarily involved many differing talents, 
services and supplies. The end product is 
the result of collective judgments and 
collective efforts. If there is fault 
inherent in the completed structure as a 
result of which injury is sustained, it seems 
fundamentally fair that all those who 
participate in the enterprise should be held 
to account for their share of the blame for 
any negligent acts performed or defective 
materials supplied and thus stand on the same 
footing, rather than permit the 
apportionment of blame to be determined by 
the fortuity of the timing of the discovery 
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of the defect," Id., at 175. (emphasis 
added) 
Applying the rationale of Henderson, it seems rational 
and sensible that architects, contractors and design 
professionals along with materialman, suppliers, and owners are 
all part of the same class. They all offer differing talents, 
services and supplies and are all working toward the successful 
completion of the construction project. The end product whether 
a home or office building is the end result of collective 
judgments and collective efforts of the individuals. To limit 
the liability of design professionals at the expense of 
materialman, suppliers, and owners seems fundamentally unfair and 
is the type of discrimination that the Utah Const, art. I, § 2 
and art. I, § 24 was designed to protect against. 
On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court of Utah has 
held a statute unconstitutional because it does not operate 
uniformly on the members of a class. In State Tax Commission vs. 
Department of Finance. 576 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978) the Court held 
the statute unconstitutional because it singled out the State 
Insurance Fund from all insurance companies that were found to 
be within the same class to pay a special tax. The Court stated: 
"Equal protection protects against 
discrimination within a class. The 
legislature has considerable discretion in 
the designation of classification that the 
Court must determine whether such 
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classification operate equally on all persons 
similarly situated." Id. at 1298. 
Furthermore, when persons are similarly situated, it 
is unconstitutional to single out one person or group of persons 
from among a larger class on the basis of a tenuous 
justification that has little or no merit. Malan vs. Lewis. 693 
P.2d 661, 671 (Utah 1984). In Dodgetown. Inc. vs. Romney, 
480 P. 2d 461 (Utah 1971), this Court held unconstitutional a 
Sunday closing law that required only licensed automobile dealers 
to close and permitted other business to transact business on 
Sunday because the discrimination failed to further the 
legislative purpose of preventing fraud and auto thefts. 
Therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as 
amended) should be found unconstitutional violating equal 
protection guarantee's of the Utah Constitution. 
POINT V 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 AS AMENDED) 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATING THE UTAH CONST. 
ART. 1, § 11 BY DEPRIVING APPELLANT ACCESS TO 
THE COURTS AND REDRESS OF INJURIES. 
The Utah Const, art. I, § 11 is part of the Declaration 
of Rights. The purpose of this section is to provide all people 
access to the courts in order to have redress for injuries. This 
section states as follows: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in person, property 
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or reputation, shall have remedy by due 
course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this state, 
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party." 
As explained in Berrv vs. Beech Air Craft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 
1985), approximately 37 states have constitutional provisions 
that are similar to Utahfs open court provision. There is no 
similar provision under the Federal Constitution. This provision 
allows all individuals access to the court based on fairness and 
equity. The framers of the Utah Constitution intended that 
individuals cannot be arbitrarily denied access to the courts 
nor be denied remedies that may be obtained therein. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Berry vs. Beech Aircraft, 717 
P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985) quoted favorably the South Dakota Supreme 
Court decision of Daugaard vs. Baltic Corporative Building Supply 
Association, 349 N.W.2d 419, 425 (S. D. 1984) where that court 
stated: 
"Our constitution is solid core upon which 
all our state laws must be premised. Clearly 
and unequivocally, our constitution directs 
that the courts of this state shall be open 
to the injured and oppressed. We are unable 
to view this constitutional mandate as a 
faint echo to be skirted or ignored. Our 
constitution is free to provide greater 
protections for our citizens than are 
reguired under the Federal Constitution. . . 
Our constitution has spoken, and it is our 
duty to listen." 
Berry vs. Beech Air Craft, 717 P.2d at 676. (emphasis added) 
Likewise, Utah's Constitution is also free to provide 
greater protections for it's citizens than are required under the 
Federal Constitution. 
In Jackson vs. Mannesmann Demaa Corp., 435 S.2d 725 
(Ala. 1983), a person was injured by an electrical arc furnace 
and brought claims against the corporations on the 
manufacturer's liability doctrine and on negligence. The Circuit 
Court entered judgment in favor of the defendant corporations 
based on the statute of repose regarding improvements to real 
estate, and an appeal was taken. The Supreme Court held that the 
statute of repose, Ala. Code § 6-5-218, (1975), regarding 
improvements to real estate, violated Alabama's open court 
provision of the State Constitution. 
Ala. Code § 6-5-218, (1975), would not allow an action 
to be commenced against any person performing or furnishing the 
design, planning, supervision or observation of construction or 
the construction of an improvement to real property more than 
seven years after the substantial completion of the improvement. 
Ala. Code § 6-5-218, (1975), is strikingly similar to Utah's 
statute of repose being challenged. Previously, Ala. Code Title 
7, § 23(1) (supp. 1973) was the statute which preempted Ala. Code 
Section 6-5-218. Ala. Code Title 7, § 23(1) was found 
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unconstitutional in Baaby Elevator Electric Co.f vs. McBride, 291 
S.2d 306 (Ala. 1974). The Alabama Supreme Court in Bagby struck 
down the seven year limitation as violative of the Alabama 
Constitutional requirement that a bill's title clearly express 
its subject and that its body contain only one subject. 
In any event, the plaintiff in Jackson v. Mannesmann 
Demag Corp. 435 S.2d 725 (Ala. 1983) argued that Ala. Code § 6-5-
218 (1975) was unconstitutional on the following grounds: 
1. The act violated Ala. Const, art. I, § 13 i.e. the 
open court provision. 
2. The act violated the equal protection clauses of 
the United States and Alabama Constitutions. 
3. The method of enactment of Ala. Code § 6-5-218 
(1975) violated Section 45 of the Alabama Constitution, requiring 
that a bill's title clearly express its subject and that its body 
only contain one subject. 
4. The act violated the due process clauses of the 
United States and Alabama Constitution. 
In striking Ala. Code § 6-5-218 (1975) in Jackson, the 
Alabama Supreme Court relied on Lankford vs. Sullivan. Long, and 
Hagertv, 416 S.2d 996 (Ala. 1982) where the Alabama Supreme 
Court ruled that Alabama's product liability statute of repose 
violated the open court provision of the Ala. Const, art. I § 13. 
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The statute in Lankford, which was a statute of repose like the 
one at issue here, not only limited the period of time during 
which an action could be brought, but also prevented a cause of 
action from occurring for injuries caused by products which were 
put into use more than ten years before they caused the injury. 
Both statutes abolished causes of action theretofore known under 
Alabama law. The Products Liability Statute abolished causes of 
action for injury caused by products over ten years old; 
Alabamafs Architects and Builders Statute abolished actions for 
damages caused by defects in improvements to real property if 
seven years has expired from completion. The appellees in 
Jackson vs Mannesmann Demaq Corp. , 435 S.2d 725, 727, 728 (Ala. 
1983) point to three grounds which, they argue, support their 
contention that Ala. Code § 6-5-218, (1975) unlike the products 
liability statute, was a legitimate exercise of the states police 
power and attempt to eradicate a perceived social evil. Jackson 
vs. Mannesmann Demaq Corp., 435 S.2d 725, 727, 728 (Ala. 1983). 
First, the appellees argue that buildings and other 
structures have a relatively long life span vis-a-vis 
manufactured products. Therefore, appellees argue, the statute 
was a reasonable attempt to limit what might otherwise amount to 
an exposure to liability for an unlimited period of time. 
Next, the appellees argued that the longer period of 
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time between the completion of the structure and injury, the 
greater the opportunity for some intervening negligence to occur. 
Finally, the appellees argued that Ala. Code § 6-5-218 
(1975) protects against the defendants having to mount the 
defense with "stale evidence." 
The Alabama Supreme Court in Jackson, held that 
neither of the above three arguments advanced by the appellees 
were persuasive. In response to these three arguments the 
Supreme Court in Jackson, cited favorably the decision of 
Overland Construction vs. Sirmons, 369 S.2d 572 (Fla. 1979) 
wherein the Supreme Court of Florida, in striking down a similar 
statute as offensive to that state's "open court" provision in 
its constitution, replied as follows: 
"We recognize the problems which are inherent 
in exposing builders and related 
professionals to potential liability for an 
indefinite period of time after an 
improvement to real property has been 
completed. Undoubtedly, the passage of time 
does aggravate the difficulty of producing 
reliable evidence, and it is likely that 
advances in technology tend to push 
industries standards inexorably higher. The 
impact of these problems, however, is felt by 
all litigants. Moreover, the difficulties of 
proof would seem to fall at least as heavily 
on injured plaintiffs, who must generally 
carry the initial burden of establishing that 
the defendant was negligent. In any event, 
these problems are not unique to the 
construction industry, and they are not 
sufficiently compelling to justify the 
enactment of legislation which, without 
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providing an alternate means of redress, 
totally abolishes an injured person's cause 
of action. The legislation impermissively 
benefits only one class of defendants, at the 
expense of an injured parties right to sue, 
and in violation of our constitutional 
guarantee of access to court." 
Overland Construction vs. Sirmons, 369 S.2d at 574 (Fla. 1979). 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Alabama in Jackson vs. 
Mannesmann Demaa Corp.. 435 S.2d 725 (Ala. 1983) further 
supported their decision and held as follows: 
"We rule that the appellees have failed to 
show a substantial relationship between Ala. 
Code § 6-5-218 and the eradication of any 
social evils sufficient to distinguish this 
case from Lankford. Furthermore, this 
statute, like the products liability statute 
of repose, has no "savings clause" to provide 
parties injured near the expiration of the 
seven year period the sufficient time to seek 
redress for their injuries. Under our ruling 
in Lankford, the failure of such a statute to 
make some provision for those injured shortly 
before expiration of the limitations makes 
the statute arbitrary on its face and can not 
be upheld. Lankford, at 1003-1004. 
.Because Ala. Code § 6-5-218 contains the 
same constitutional infirmities as the 
products liability statute struck down in 
Lankford, we deem it unnecessary to discuss 
the appellants additional contention." 
Jackson at 729. 
The same constitutional infirmities found in Berry vs. 
Beech Aircraft, 717 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985) were also found in 
Lankford vs. Sullivan. Long and Hacrerty, 416 S.2d 996 (Ala. 
1982). Likewise, the rational of the Alabama Supreme Court in 
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striking down the Ala. Code § 6-5-218, (1975), is persuasive and 
should be followed by this Court in striking down Utah Code Ann, 
§ 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended). Both Alabama and Utah's statute 
of repose are similar in their wording and effect. Both statutes 
close the door to litigants before they knew it was opened. 
Indeed, since the framers of the Utah Constitution felt that the 
courts of Utah should be open to all individuals, this 
constitutional provision and guarantee should not be viewed as a 
"faint echo". The constitution has spoken, and it is our duty to 
listen. See also Saylor vs. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973) and 
Phillips vs. ABC Builders Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980) wherein 
both Kentucky and Wyoming found similar statutes of repose 
unconstitutional as a violation of the open court provisions of 
their individual state constitutions. 
POINT VI 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 AS AMENDED) 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATING THE UTAH 
CONST. ART. VI, § 26 FORBIDDING SPECIAL LAWS 
OR LEGISLATION 
Utah Const, art. VI, § 26 states in part as follows: 
11
. . . In all cases where a general law can 
be applicable, no special law shall be 
enacted..." 
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Wyoming in Phillips vs. ABC 
Builders, Inc. . 611 P. 2d 821 (Wyo. 1980) ruled on the 
constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-111, (1977) which is 
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Wyoming's Architect and Builder statute of repose. 
In Phillips, the plaintiff purchased a home in July 
1977, the construction of which was substantially completed on or 
about May 22, 1969. After heavy rains, the basement and 
foundation walls began to collapse on or about May 25, 1978. 
Plaintiffs were forced to vacate the home. On September 19, 
1979, plaintiffs filed a complaint in District Court seeking 
damages from ABC Builders. Inc., which company substantially 
completed the home on or about May 22, 1969. The district court 
granted ABC Builders motion to dismiss on the grounds that the 
statute of limitations had run. The District Court was reversed 
by the Wyoming Supreme Court which held as follows: 
"We hold that the statute in question, Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-3-111, supra, is not a statute of 
limitations, but is a grant of immunity from 
suit. Its immunity is conferred only on a 
narrow spectrum of defendants. We hold that 
there is no rational or reasonable 
justification for granting this immunity to 
these limited class of persons. Further, we 
hold that this statute is a special law which 
at least to the extent that no special law 
can be made enacted where a general law can 
be made applicable. In this instance, a 
general law can be made applicable. The Wyo. 
Const., § 7, art. 1 and § 27, art. 3, supra. 
Moreover, a statute operates so as to close 
courts to individuals who have had dealings 
with a protected class in violation of the 
Wyo. Const., § 5, art. I, supra." 
Phillips vs. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d at 831. 
The court in Phillips, like most courts striking 
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similar statutes, cites favorably the seminal of Skinner vs. 
Anderson, 213 N.E.2d 588 (111 1967). The Illinois court in 
Skinner found the statute unconstitutional which mirrored the 
Wyoming statute. Both the Wyoming and Illinois statutes in 
encompass the essence of Utah statute. The court in Phillips 
found the reasoning of Skinner to be persuasive also. The 
important parts of that decision have been previously discussed 
in Point III, of this brief. 
It is obvious that a general law can be made 
applicable in Utah. For example, the State of Oregon enacted a 
general statute in 1967, the same year Utah enacted their 
Architect and Builder statute of repose. It states: 
"In no event shall any action for negligent 
injury to person or property of another be 
commenced more than ten years from the date 
of the act or omission complained of." 
Josephs vs. Burns. 491 P.2d 203 (Or. 1971). In this statute, 
immunity is accorded to every alleged tortfeasor after the 
passage of ten years. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) grants to 
persons such as the defendants a privilege and immunity as to a 
particular benefit or advantage denied to other persons, i.e., 
the right to be free from suit after seven years have past from 
the completion of any physical improvement to real property. 
This immunity is not granted to an owner of real property or any 
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person in control of the property, who makes the improvement. 
Any person, firm or corporation that owns property is in the same 
class as the architect or builder, but lacks the immunity granted 
to the architect or builder. The statute not only denies the 
owner immunity, it also denies the owner the right to 
contribution or indemnity. Constitutional muster can not justify 
the special immunity accorded to the protected class but denies 
to others similarly situated. The cases relied upon, which fail 
to find statutes unconstitutional, do not come to grips with the 
real problem presented; what factors distinguish the favored 
class so that it requires or deserves immunity not accorded 
others which appear to be similarly situated. (Kallas Millwork 
Corp. vs. Square D Company, 225 N.W.2d 454, 460 (Wis. 1975). 
Finally, the business of engaging in a construction 
projects is one clothed with a public interest. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) makes no provision which protects 
the interest of owners of property. No reasonable connection is 
shown between granting special privileges and immunities involved 
in construction projects and denying them to citizens who own 
real property upon which improvements are made. 
Consequently, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as 
amended) should be held unconstitutional as a violation of the 
Utah Const, art. VI, § 26 forbidding special laws or legislation. 
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POINT VII 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 AS AMENDED) 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATING THE UTAH CONST. 
ART. VI, § 23 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
REQUIRING THAT ONE SUBJECT BE CLEARLY 
EXPRESSED IN THE STATUTORY TITLE 
The Utah Const, art. VI, § 23 states in part: 
. . .No bill shall be passed containing more 
than one subject, which shall be clearly 
expressed in its title." 
Appellant maintains that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as 
amended) falls far short of advising members of the legislature 
or the public that it is not a statute of limitations. Section 
25.5 is found under Article II entitled "other than real 
property." Sections 22 through 25 proscribe different statutory 
limitations, which are in fact genuine statutes of limitation. 
However Section 25.5 is not a statute of limitations but a 
statute of repose. Section 26 through 31.2 are once again 
normal statutes of limitation. Section 25.5 is placed in the 
midst of many statutes of limitation. 
The title of Section 25.5 is "Injury Due to Defective 
Design or Construction to Real Property-Within Seven Years." As 
stated above, this heading falls far short of advising members of 
legislature or the public that Section 25.5 is not a statute of 
limitation; that it bars a cause of action before it arises; that 
it bars a right of action coming into existence if the accident 
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occurs subsequent to the seven year period. This language would 
lead members of the legislature and the public to believe that 
this section would fall within the normal Article II "other than 
real property" limitation periods. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 
(1953 as amended) was enacted in 1967 in the midst of a national 
lobby effort to limit the exposure of architects, contractors and 
related professionals. In an attempt to limit exposure, the 
American Institute of Architects, the National Society of 
Professional Engineers, and the Associated General Contractors of 
America lobbied for enactment of statutes limiting the period 
subsequent to the construction of a given improvement during 
which an action might be brought for injuries allegedly caused by 
architects or other construction personnel. As a result of their 
lobbying efforts, numerous states passed statutes associating the 
accrual of a cause of action in conclusion of construction rather 
than with a result of injury to the plaintiff. Jackson vs. 
Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 S.2d 725, 726 (Ala. 1983). 
As with the majority of other states, Utah enacted in 
1967 the statute that is now being challenged. The statute 
cannot pass constitutional muster since the subject of the 
statute must be clearly expressed in the title. State of Utah 
vs. Twitchell. 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1959), State 
vs. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647 (Utah 1944), and State vs. 
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Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414 (Utah 1939). 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Alabama in Baqby Elevator 
and Electric Co. Inc. vs. McBride, 291 S.2d 306 (Ala. 1974) 
struck a statute which is almost verbatim like the Utah Const. 
art. VI,. § 23. The court in McBride, stated as follows with 
reference to their constitutional provision that the subject be 
"clearly expressed in the title": 
"The object of the constitutional provision 
has been held to be three fold, first, to 
fairly apprise the people, through the 
publication of legislative proceedings as is 
usually made, of the subject of legislation 
that are being considered, in order that 
they may have the opportunity of being heard 
thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they 
shall so desire; second, truly to inform the 
members of the legislature who are to vote 
upon the bill, what the subject of it is so 
that they may not perform that duty, 
deceived or ignorant of what they are doing; 
and third to prevent the practice of 
embracing in one bill several distinct 
matters, none of which, perhaps could singly 
obtain assent of the legislature, and 
procuring its passage by combination of the 
minorities in favor of each of the measures, 
into a majority that will adopt them all." 
Baqby Elevator and Electric Co. Inc. vs. McBride, 291 S.2d at 
308. 
The title of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as 
amended) does not indicate whether it is a traditional statute of 
limitation or a statute of repose. 
Finally, the Supreme Court in McBride, stated as 
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follows: 
"It seems clear, however, that when the Title 
purports to establish a traditional statute 
of limitations, but the body in fact does 
something different, not merely in degree but 
in kind, by declaring, in effect, that no 
substantive right to bring an action exists 
seven years after a certain event, then the 
subject has not been clearly expressed and 
the purposes of the Title as established by 
this Court have not been met. Thus, as 
applied to causes of action accruing more 
than seven years after completion of the 
improvement, the act, by virtue of it's 
defective title, violates Section 45 of the 
State (Alabama) constitution. McBride, at 
309, 310." 
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) does 
not differentiate from other statutes of limitation contained in 
chapter 12. Most statutes of limitation deal merely with the 
procedural rights, not with eliminating substantive rights. 
Section 25.5 effectively eliminates many causes of action before 
they can actually accrue. 
Finally, the Title of Section 25.5 is not any different 
than the other statutes of limitations contained in Article II. 
That is, all 25.5 states is that the action should be brought 
within "seven years." Nothing in the title denotes that this is 
a statute of repose which deals with substantive rights as 
opposed to a statute of limitations which deals with procedural 
rights. Consequently, the Utah Const, art. VI, § 23 has been 
violated since the challenged statute does not clearly express 
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its self in a statutory title. 
CONCLUSION 
UTAH'S PUBLIC POLICY SHOULD NOT ALLOW 
ARCHITECTS, ENGINEERS, OR CONTRACTORS TO 
SHIELD THEMSELVES WITH IMMUNITY FROM SUIT 
There is no reason to treat architects, engineers, or 
contractors any different from materialman, suppliers, owners, or 
tenants. All of these individuals play an important role in the 
construction of a home, building or improvement to real property. 
Here the proximate cause of plaintiff's damages extends 
from a defect in either the design, planning or construction of 
the Park City cabin. The report of Arnold W. Coon, P. E., L. S., 
states that the structure was not built according to design 
specifications and that the architect could have noticed such 
deviations through his periodic inspections. Utah's statute in 
its present form does not promote the building of safe structures 
or improvements. It has the opposite effect of encouraging short 
cuts. Design and planning professionals may take cost saving 
measures which are not anticipated in the design of the 
structure. The result can be catastrophic to both life and 
property, as it was to the appellant. 
Finally, the open court provision of the Utah Const, 
art. I, § 11 provides greater protection for its citizens than 
required under the Federal Constitution. Our Constitution has 
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spoken and it is our duty to listen. Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 
717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985). 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff requests that the District 
Court Order of Dismissal be reversed and that Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) be declared unconstitutional on the 
above stated grounds, and that this case be remanded to the 
District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
DATED this ' S of August, 1988. 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
J. Mark' tffrimpey 
i ' < 
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foregoing Supreme Court Brief to: 
Thomas R. Grisley 
Biehle, Haslam & Hatch 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
Jerry Cutshaw and Interiors 
Contracting, Inc. 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
James A. Murphy 
Murphy, Mabey & Tolboe 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondent 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 1 
INVESTIGATION OF ROOF FAILURE 
AT THE 
5CHICK-5UN CABIN 
NEAR GUARDSMAN PASS 
WASATCH COUNTY, UTAH 
ARNOLD W. COON, P.E., LS. 
FORENSIC ENGINEERING 
CONSULTING • STRUCTURAL • INVESTIGATIONS 
5330 SOUTH 900 EAST SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84117 (801) 262-2666 
JUNE 1, 1986 
Aetna Insurance Company 
445 East 4500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attn: Ross Whitlock 
Re: Roof failure at Schick-Sun Cabin near Guardsman Pass, Wasatch 
County, Utah. (86045) 
Dear Mr. Whitlock; 
At your request, I accompanied you, Max Smith (architect), Leon Tanner 
(structural engineer) and a contractor in a visit to the above site on 
Saturday, May 10, 1986. The following is a brief summary of our findings 
to date. 
1. The cabin was designed by Max Smith, architect. His structural 
consultant was Leon Tanner, with Edmund Allen Engineers. The 
plans were drawn in August of 1978. Originally, the cabin had a 
partial basement, main floor, mezzanine and roof. An addition 
was made to the basement at a later date. 
2. The cabin has plan dimensions of 35'-0" by 35'-0". It is divided 
into four equal quadrants which are each 17'-6" square. An eight 
inch square steel tubular column is located at each corner of the 
quadrants. At the roof level, a glulam beam is located along each 
side of the quadrants. These bear on the steel columns noted 
above. The clear distance between the glulam beams was to be 
!6'-8 7/8". Joists, which are spaced at 16 " centers, span be-
tween the glulam beams. The orientation of the joist spans 
changes 90 degrees in adjacent quadrants. The joists are a 
patented product which is manufactured by Trus-Joist 
Corporation with headquarters in Boise, Idaho. Their product and 
service is the "Cadillac" of this type of framing. It consists of a 
type of open web truss. The top and bottom chords are made of 
wood. The diagonal web members are made of round steel tubes 
which are flattened at their ends. The flattened ends fit into 
slots which are cut in the chord members. They are permanently 
attached with steel pins which are tightly fit into holes in the 
wood and holes in the tubes. Two light steel anges are connected 
in the end joints of the top chord to provide articulating bearing 
seats. Trus-Joist also provides wood bearing plates which are to 
be attached to the tops of the supporting beams. These wood 
plates have pre-cut slots at the same spacing as the joists. 
These slots receive the flattened ends of the end web members 
and allow the bearing angles to fit on top of the beam. This 
prevents any eccentricity which would cause bending stresses in 
the top chord which could cause a failure. 
3. We have included a portion of the plans which were provided by 
Trus-Joist for this project. They were careful to provide 
dimensional information which was compatible with the 
architect's plans and with the fabrication of the joists. The 
contractor should have been careful to see that these dimensions 
were fully complied with. We have noted the actual dimension on 
these plans 
4 At the time the cabin was designed, there was no "official" snow 
load requirement for Wasatch County. The design snow loads 
were left up to the discretion of the structural engineer. 
Trus-Joist provided joists which were capable of carrying a 
total load of 195 pounds per square foot (psf) with an adequate 
factor of safety. They broke the total load into a dead load of 25 
psf and a snow load of 170 psf. The actual dead load was closer 
to 15 psf. This would give a reserve for a snow load of 180 psf. 
Subsequent studies have been unofficially published which give a 
design snow load of approximately 190 psf. A new publication is 
about ready for issue which may have some minor revisions to 
this figure. In any event, it appears that the design loads were 
certainly within a reasonable range. 
5. The contractor built the cabin with greater dimensions between 
the glulam beams than were called for on the plans. He also 
appears to have either left the wood bearing plates off, which 
were provided by Trus-Joist, or he did not install them as shown 
on the plans. We have included a sketch'which shows how they 
should have been installed and another sketch which shows how 
they were actually installed. The quadrant which failed was 
constructed with 5 5/8" too much span. This caused 
eccentricities in the top chords of the joists which overstressed 
them to the point of failure. The other three spans were also too 
long. Going clockwise around the roof from the failed area, the 
excess span lengths are 4 7/8", 1 1/8" and 5/8". It is 
unconscionable that the contractor allowed this to happen 
without calling his discrepancy to someone's attention. 
6. The architect's contract called for him to make periodic visits to 
the site to see that the contractor was conforming to the plans. 
The problem in the framing was so obvious that it should have 
been caught by the architect. 
7. The Building Code requires that two roof drains be provided for 
each draianage area unless scuppers are installed at the walls to 
prevent the ponding of water on the roof. The architect provided 
two roof drains; however, he failed to recognize that a "dead 
flat" roof deflects under load and causes areas which are lower 
than those over the supporting beams The roof framing also 
develops some "creep" which causes permanent deflections and 
low areas which do not drain adequately to the two drains which 
were provided. Thus, in some areas, greater loads cause greater 
deflections which in turn create areas of greater load which 
cause greater deflections, etc. This may have contributed a 
little to the failure. It would be advisable to put at least one 
roof drain at the low point of each quadrant. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The primary cause of failure was the contractor's lack of 
precision in constructing the building to the dimensions shown 
on the plans which were prepared both by the architect and the 
supplier of the joists. 
2. The architect should have caught the contractor's errors during 
his inspections of the construction. 
3. Of lesser concern is the fact that the architect did not provide 
enough roof drains at the low points of the roof to properly take 
care of deflections and creep. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Remove the ceiling paneling and insulation as necessary. 
2. Replace the joists which have failed. 
3. Properly attach new ledgers, with slots for the joist web 
members, to the sides of the existing glulam beams to provide 
support for the remaining joists. 
4 Install new roof drains as noted above. 
5. Reinstall the insulation and ceiling panels. 
The above work should be designed, coordinated and inspected by the 
original architect and structural engineer. 
If we may be of further service to you, please let us know. 
Arnold W. Coon, P.E., L.S., ACEC 
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PRE-NOTCHED PLATE 
BY TRUS-JOIST 
REACTION 
GLULAMBEAM 
FORCES INTERSECT AT-A COMMON POINT 
NO ECCENTRICITY IN TOP CHORD 
END DETAIL AS DESIGNED 
ECCENTRICITY CAUSES TOP CHORD BENDING 
END DETAIL AS BUILT 
DESCRIPTION OF PHOTOGRAPHS 
Photo No. Description 
1. View looking upward at the roof framing. The ceiling and 
insulation have been removed. Every Trus-Joist end failed 
where it was attached to the glulam beam which is shown. 
The roof sheathing acted as a suspension system and 
prevented a total collapse. 
2. This is a view looking parallel to the glulam beam which is 
shown on Photo I. Each joist end has failed at the top 
chord end pin. 
3. This is a view of the condition at the opposite end of the 
joists shown on Photos 1 and 2. Some failures occurred 
at this end of the joists also. This joist end did not fail 
but it shows the condition of installation. The red arrow 
points to the steel bearing angle which did not bear on the 
glulam due to an excessive span between the glulams. 
4. This is a view of the condition at the opposite end of the 
joists shown on Photos I and 2. Some failures occurred 
at this end of the joists also. This joist end did not fail 
but it shows the condition of installation. The red arrow 
points to the steel bearing angle which did not bear on the 
glulam due to an excessive span between the glulams. 
5. thru 9. These is are views of typical ends which failed. The green 
arrows point to the pin locations in the top chord pieces 
which are still bearing on the glulam beam. The red 
arrows point to the pins which are still connected to a 
piece of the top chord which separated from the locations 
shown with the red arrows. The orange arrows point to 
the steel bearing angles which did not bear on the glulam 
beam. 
10. and I I . These are views in two of the other quadrants where there 
were no failures. The green arrows point to the steel 
bearing angles which do not fit the glulam beams as they 
should due to the increased clear span between the beams. 
The red arrows point to what appear to be the slotted 
wood plates which were provided by Trus-Joist. 



ADDENDUM 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL LITCHFIELD, ; 
Plaintiff, t 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
VS. : 
CIVIL NO. C 87-6238 
JERRY CUTSHAW, individually dba : 
INTERIORS CONTRACTING, MAX J. 
SMITH, an individual, and MAX : 
J. SMITH AND ASSOCIATES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss was orally argued on the 10th 
day of December 1987. Plaintiff was represented by J. Mark 
Whimpey and defendants Interior Contracting, Inc. and Jerry 
Cutshaw were represented by Thomas R. Grisley. Defendants Max J. 
Smith and Associates, Inc. and Max J. Smith were represented by 
James A. Murphy. Defendants1 motion was taken under advisement 
pending the filing of additional memoranda. The court after 
receiving the supplemental memoranda held an informal hearing 
with counsel in chambers. Counsel was advised orally of the 
court's decision and that a brief written Memorandum Decision 
would be mailed to counsel. Based on the foregoing the court 
renders the following decision. 
LITCHFIELD V. CUTSHAW, ET AL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The questions to be resolved in this case are whether or not 
the plaintiff is precluded from bringing this action pursuant to 
the provisions of 78-12-25.5 U.C.A. 1953 as amended and if said 
section is constitutional. 
There is no dispute that the cabin that suffered a roof 
failure had been constructed and occupied for more than seven 
years and the complaint was not filed within the seven year 
statutory period. 
Section 78-12-25.5 U.C.A. 1953 as amended reads as follows: 
Injury due to defective design or construction of 
improvement to real property - within seven years. 
No action to recover damages for any injury 
to property, real or personal, or for any 
injury to the person, or for bodily injury or 
wrongful death, arising out of the defective 
and unsafe condition of an improvement to 
real property, nor any action for damages 
sustained on account of such injury, shall be 
brought against any person performing or 
furnishing the design, planning, supervision 
of construction or construction of such 
improvement to real property more than seven 
years after the completion of construction. 
* * * 
(2) Completion of construction for 
the purpose of this act shall mean 
the date of issuance of certifi-
cate of substantial completion by 
the owner, architect, engineer or 
other agents, or the date of the 
owners use or possession of the 
improvement on the real property. 
The limitation imposed by this provision 
shall not apply to any person in actual 
possession and control as owner, tenant or 
otherwise, of the improvement at the time the 
defective and unsafe condition of such 
improvement constitutes the proximate cause 
of the injury for which it is proposed to 
bring in action. 
LITCHFIELD V. CUTSHAWf ET AL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
This provision shall not be construed as 
extending or limiting the periods otherwise 
prescribed by the laws of this state for the 
bringing of any action. 
The language of Section 78-12-25.5 is rather ambiguous but 
the case of Good v. Christensen, 527 P2d 223 (Utah) attempts to 
interpret the language pertaining to the exception contained in 
said section. 
According to the Good v. Christensen xuling the owner or 
person in actual possession cannot bring an action against the 
architect or contractor if more than seven years from the date of 
completion has expired. The net effect of this interpretation is 
that the potential liability for a dangerous condition of 
premises is left on the owner or the person in possession if 
injury is caused by circumstances that normally give rise to a 
cause of action. 
The case of Salesian Society v. Formiali Corporation, 295 
A.2d 19 (1972) cited by Justice Ellett in the Good v. Christensen 
case in support of the Utah Supreme Court's decision explains in 
greater detail the rational for the upholding a seven year 
statute repose and the reasons for such a statute being deemed 
constitutional. 
The court concludes that the plaintiff's action be dismissed 
as against these defendants because of Good v. Christensen and 
for the reasons set forth in defendants1 memorandum. However, 
the court believes that the plaintiffs case is not without 
merit. The court has reservations about its ruling but will 
LITCHFIELD V. CUTSHAW, ET AL PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
follow precedent of the present Utah case law. 
Dated this // day of February, 1988. 
^-JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
Copies mailed to counsel. 
THOMAS R. fiRISITY (3802) of 
B INE, HASLAM A HATCH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Jerry" Cutshaw and Interiors Contracting 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Sail Lake Citv, UT 8410? 
Telephone: (801) 328-1666 
H: B1XCN HiKU^Mftfr ' 
3ao D1ST: C9WRT 
d y .—... ~ _~^~ / ii i ffiif 
. i v n \ r r? x ' 
Ifl THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
HI AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL LICHTEFELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERRY CUTSHAW, individually and 
dba INTERIORS CONTRACTING, MAX J, 
SMITH, an individual, and MAX J. 
SMITH AND ASSOCIATES, INC., a 
Utah corporation. 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL RE-
DEFENDANTS JERRY CUTSHAW 
^ v i d u a l l y and dba INTERIORS 
CONTRACTING, MAX J. SMITH, an 
individual, and MAX J. SMITH AND 
ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah 
corporation 
Civil No. C87-06238 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
The Court having heard Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on December 
10, 1987- having reviewed the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
and the Supplemental Memorandum in the Court's file; having issued a 
Memorandum Decision dated February 11, 1988, and based upon the reasoning 
set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED: 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. Defendants. Jerry 
Cutshaw, individually and dba Interiors Contracting, Max J. Smith, an 
individual, and Max J. Smith and Associates, Inc., a Utah corporation, are 
dismissed from the above-captioned matter, and Plaintiff's action against 
th^se Defendants is hereby dismissed with preiudice. 
DATED this _ ^ „ d a y of J ^ ^ ^ _ 1988. 
BY THE COURT 
JSJL 
John A. Rokich 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form 4 Content: 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
mwl-f 
ADDENDUM 3 
State 
Ala. 
Status 
Un Const. 7 & 23 
Status as of July, 1988 
Statute Case Lav Reasons 
6-5-218 
291 S.2d 306 can't have two 
(1974) subjects under one 
title 
313 S.2d 518 vague 
(1975) 
435 S. 2d 727 open courts 
(1983) 
Alaska Un Const. 09.10.055 752 P.2d 467 
(1988) 
equal protection 
Arizona No statute just use general 
statute of 
limitations 
Arkansas Const. 37-237 
(supp. 1983) 248 Ark. 1172, 
455 S.W.2d 918 
(1970), appeal 
dismissed, 401 US 901 
Cal, Const. 337.15 
337.1 
581 P.2d 197 
133 Cal. App. 3d 171, 
183 Cal. R. 881 
148 Cal. R. 219 
Colorado Un Const.13-80-127(1) 494 F. Supp. 1334 
Const. 
(1980) 
514 F. Supp. 
1212 (1981) 
655 P.2d 822 
(1983) 
equal protection 
Conn. Const. 52-584a 207 Conn. 496 (1988) 
207 Conn. 599 (1988) 
200 Conn. 562 (1986) 
Delaware Const. 10 8127 489 A.2d 413 
(1984) same case 
462 A.2d 420 
Florida Un. Const. 95.11(3)(C) 369 So.2d 572 
(1979) Open courts; Due 
Process 
413 So.2d 75 
(1982), due process 
451 So.2d 463 remanded 
Georgia Const. 9-3-51(a)(3) 300 S.E.2d 507 
(1983) 
prior law was 
3-1006 296 S.E.2d 
579 (1982) 
Hawaii Un Const. 657-8 514 P.2d 568 
(1973) equal protection 
647 P.2d 276 
(1982) equal protection 
Idaho Const. 5-241 644 P.2d 341 
(1982) 
Illinois Const. 
and 
Un Const, 
(prior law) 
110-13-214(a) 500 N.E.2d 69 
(1986) 
500 N.E.2d 34 
(1986) 
483 N.E.2d 613 
(1985) 
456 N.E.2d 353 
231 N.E.2d 588 
(1967) equal protection 
2 
Indiana Const, 
statute 
is const, 
but old law 
is un const. 
34-4-202 447 N.E.2d 622 
(1983) 
Iowa No cha l lenge 614.1 (11) 
Kansas No s t a t u t e use general 
s t a t u t e o f 
l i m i t a t i o n s 
60-501 
Kentucky Un. Const. 413.135 497 S.W.2d 218 
(1973) due process 
704 S.W.2d 179 
(1986) special leg. 
Louisiana Const. 9.2772 366 So.2d 1381 
(1978) 
394 So.2d 822 
(1981) 
Maine No Challenge 14 752-A 
Maryland Const. 5-108(b) 499 A.2d 178 
(1985) 
Mass. Const. 260 2B 437 N.E.2d 514 
(1982) 
506 N.E.2d 513 
(1987) 
3 
Michigan Const. 27A. 5839 299 N.W.2d 336 
(1980) 
375 N.W.2d 397 
(1985) 
266 N.W.2d 795 
(1978) 
266 N.W.2d 850 
(1978) 
this case 
was reversed 
in 299 N.W. 
2d 336. 
equal prot. 
Minn. Const. 541.051 
and amended 
un. Const, in 1980 
so now it 
const. 
260 N.W.2d 548 
480 F.2d 793 
(1973) 
318 N.W.2d 838 
(1982) 
equal prot. 
Miss. Const. 15-1-41 402 S.2d 320 
(1981) 
Missouri no challenge 516-097 
Montana Const. 27-2-208 551 P.2d 642 
(1976) 
statute used 
to be 93-2619 
& 93-2621 
Nebraska Const. 25-223 404 N.W.2d 32 
(1987) 
279 N.W.2d 603 
(1979) 
335 N.W.2d 530 
(1983) 
321 N.W.2d 913 
(1982) 
4 
Nevada Un. Const. 11.205 660 P.2d 998 
(1983) equal prot. 
New 
Hamp. 
New 
Jersey 
New 
Mexico 
New York 
Un. Const. 508:4-6 
Const. 2A: 14-1.: 
Const. 37-1-27 
No statute 
architects, but 
has a general 
malpractice 
statute which 
governs negligence 
by professionals 
N.Y. Civ. Prac. 
§ 214.6 
451 A.2d 174 
(1982) 
474 A.2d 566 
(1984) 
L 295 A.2d 
(1972) 
306 A.2d 
(1973) 
293 A.2d 
645 P.2d 
(1982) 
598 P.2d 
568 P.2d 
(1977) 
19 
466 
662 
1375 
218 
214 
equal prot. 
equal prot. 
raises due 
process 
concerns 
North 
Caro. 
Const. 1-50(5) 286 S.E.2d 876 
affirmed in part; 
rev. in part by 
302 S.E.2d 868 
(1983) 
5 
North 
Dakota 
Const, 28-01-44 384 N.W.2d 322 
(1986) 
420 N.W.2d 733 
(1988) 
case held 
a similar 
products 
liability 
statute 
unconst. 
as a 
violation 
of a equal 
protection 
Ohio Const. 2305.131 470 N.E.2d 950 
(1984) 
740 F.2d 1362 
(1984) 
Okla. Un. Const. 12 109 563 P.2d 143 
(1977) 
equal prot. 
Oregon Const. 12.135 491 P.2d 203 
(1985) 
Pa. Const, 42 5536 341 A.2d 184 
(1975) 
382 A.2d 715 
prior law 
12 65.1 434 A.2d 1243 
(1981) 
upheld prior 
law 
Rhode 
Island 
Const. 9-1-29 494 A.2d 543 
(1985) 
South 
Caro. 
Un. Const. 15-3-640 241 S.E. 739 
(1978) equal prot, 
6 
South 
Dakota 
Const. and 
Un. Const. 
Repealed 
15-2-9 349 N.W.2d 419 open court 
(1984) 
716 F.2d 504 
(1983) 
320 N.W.2d 131 
(1982) 
affirmed on re-
hearing 
325 N.W.2d 60 
(1982) 
Tenn. 
Texas 
Const. 
Const. 
28-3-202 
5536a 
repealed; 
superseded 
by 
16.008 & 
16.009 
619 S.W.2d 
(1981) 
663 S.W.2d 
(1984) 
695 S.W.2d 
(1985) 
731 S.W.2d 
(1987) 
618 S.W.2d 
555 S.W.2d 
522 
644 
213 
651 
870 
145 
743 F.2d 268 
(1984) 
726 F.2d 1069 
(1984) 
785 F.2d 1270 
(1986) 
696 S.W. 923 (1985) 
Utah no 
challenge 
78-12-25.5 564 P.2d 751 
(1972) 
607 P.2d 233 
(1979) 
603 P.2d 786 
(1979) 
359 P.2d 397 
(1961) 
642 P.2d 745 
(1982) 
7 
681 P.2d 181 
(1984) 
527 P.2d 233 
(1974) 
717 P.2d 678 
(1985) 
743 P.2d 1196 
(1987) 
642 P.2d 745 
(1982) 
583 P.2d 77 
(1978) 
744 P.2d 1370 
(1987) 
Vermont no statute 
(just use general 
statute of limitations 
12 § 507 & 511) 
Virginia Const, 8.01-250 371 F. Supp. 698 
(1974) 
Wash. Const. 4.16.300 503 P.2d 180 
695 P.2d 237 
691 P.2d 188 
W. Va. no challenge 55-2-6a 
Wis. Un Const. 
and 
new statute 
Const. 
893-155 
old law 
893.89 
259 N.W.2d 306 
(1977) * 
225 N.W.2d 454 
(1975) * 
272 N.W.2d 401 
(1978) 
331 N.W.2d 320 
(1983) 
301 N.W.2d 271 
(1980) 
293 N.W.2d 515 
(1980) 
* Equal protection (note-these cases struck down 893-155; a year 
later 893-155 was re-inacted, recently 893-155 was changed to 
893-89. The courts have not ruled directly on the new law. 
Wyo. Un. Const. 1-3-111(a) 611 P.2d 821 open court; 
(1980) 
632 P.2d 925 equal prot. 
(1981) special laws 
D.C. Const. 12-310 637 F. Supp. 734 
(1986) 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
A R T . I, § 2 CONSTITUTION OP UTAH 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments 
are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit, 
and they have the right to alter or reform their government as the public 
welfare may require. 
A R T . I, § 11 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 11. [Courts open—Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall ho barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
ART. VI, § 23 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 23. [Bill to contain only one subject.] 
Except general appropriation bills, and bills for the codification and 
general revision of laws, no bill shall be passed containing more than 
one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH ART. I, § 24 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
ART. VI, § 26 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 26. [Enumeration of private laws forbidden.] 
The Legislature is prohibited from enacting any private or special laws 
in the following cases: 
1. Granting divorce. 
2. Changing the names of persons or places, or constituting one person 
the heir-at-law of another. 
3. Locating or changing county scats. 
4. Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of Justices of the Peace. 
5. Punishing crimes and misdemeanors. 
6. Regulating the practice of courts of justice. 
7. Providing for a change of venue in civil or criminal actions. 
8. Assessing and collecting taxes. 
9. Regulating the interest on money. 
10. Changing the law of descent or succession. 
11. Regulating county and township affairs. 
12. Incorporating cities, towns or villages; changing or amending the 
charter of any city, town or village; laying out, opening, vacating or 
altering town plats, highways, streets, wards, alleys or public grounds. 
13. Providing for sale or mortgage of real estate belonging to minors 
or others under disability. 
14. Authorizing persons to keep ferries across streams within the State. 
15. Remitting fines, penalties or forfeitures. 
16. Granting to an individual, association or corporation any privilege, 
immunity or franchise. 
17. Providing for the management of common schools. 
18. Creating, increasing or decreasing fees, percentages or allowances 
of public officers during the term for which said officers are elected or 
appointed. 
The Legislature may repeal any existing special law relating to the 
foregoing subdivisions. 
In all cases where a general law can be applicable, no special law shall 
be enacted. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to deny or restrict the 
power of the Legislature to establish and regulate the compensation and 
fees of county and township officers; to establish and regulate the rates 
of freight, passage, toll and charges of railroads, toll roads, ditch flump 
78-12-25.5. Injury due to defective design or construction 
of improvement to real property — Within seven 
years. 
No action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or 
for any injury to the person, or for bodily ixyury or wrongful death, arising out 
of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor 
any action for damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be brought 
against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervi-
sion of construction or construction of such improvement to real property more 
than seven years after the completion of construction 
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, or any 
other legal entity. 
(2) Completion of construction for the purposes of this act shall mean 
the date of issuance of a certificate of substantial completion by the 
owner, architect, engineer or other agents, or the date of the owner's use 
or possession of the improvement on real property. 
The limitation imposed by this provision shall not apply to any person in 
actual possession and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the improve-
ment at the time the defective and unsafe condition of such improvement 
constitutes the proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed to bring 
an action. 
This provision shall not be construed as extending or limiting the periods 
otherwise prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any action. 
History: C. 1953, 78-12-25.5, enacted by L. 1967, Chapter 218, which appears as this sec-
1967, ch. 218, § 1. ti011 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this Croaa-Referencea. — Product Liability Act, 
act," refers to in Subsection (2), means Laws s U ^ U n ^ o n s . J ^ M M ^ 
